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Deflategate: Can We Eliminate Litigation in NFL
Player Discipline Disputes?
BY JEREMY SYKES / ON APRIL 16, 2016

Though the NFL offseason is set to begin, and many new stories will dominate the media, one
story refuses to go away: Deflategate. With the case currently on appeal, it is important to
entertain the possibility that the Deflategate saga has gone on for too long. Are there better
ways to resolve the issues surrounding Deflategate and NFL player discipline disputes, ones
that avoid litigation altogether?
Perhaps the best method of resolving time-sensitive litigation in NFL player discipline cases is
to eliminate the need for litigation in the first place. This could be accomplished by changing
the scope of the commissioner’s disciplinarian powers and the nature of the arbitration
process. A full, detailed analysis of the extent of the commissioner’s player disciplinary powers
is beyond the scope of this post. [2] Nonetheless, a comparison to other professional sports
leagues’ disciplinary procedures can serve as a guide for the NFL in adopting a new process.
Major League Baseball’s arbitration process involves an “impartial arbitrator or, where either
Party elects in advance of the opening of the hearing in a matter, a tripartite panel so
empowered and composed of the impartial arbitrator and two party arbitrators, one
appointed by the Association, the other appointed by the L[eague] R[elations] D[epartment].”
[3] Furthermore, “[i]n the event the Association and the LRD are unable to agree upon the
appointment of the impartial arbitrator, they jointly shall request that the American
Arbitration Association furnish them a list of prominent, professional arbitrators.” [4] Finally, at
any point during the proceeding, both Major League Baseball and the League Relations
Department have the opportunity to terminate the appointment of the impartial officer,
assuming that the moving party meet the procedural guidelines laid out in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.[5]
Major League Baseball’s arbitration process is by no means perfect. One commentator has
pointed out that practically, there is no difference between having one impartial arbitrator and
Major League Baseball’s version of the tripartite panel. [6] Additionally, “[w]hile a three-person
arbitration panel might be agreeable to both the players association and the league, it is
unlikely that the two sides will be able to mutually agree on the three arbitrators.” [7] Despite
these flaws however, Major League Baseball’s system promotes and requires impartiality in its
arbitration process. [8] In contrast, the “NFL Commissioner generally still presides over the
hearing and is responsible for final decisions in every case, which abates the procedural
safeguard provided by possibly having a designee serve as the arbitrator to a dispute.” [9]

The results of arbitration systems like that of Major League Baseball’s are staggering. Major
League Baseball has not litigated the scope of the Commissioner’s disciplinarian powers since
Pete Rose challenged his lifelong ban from Major League Baseball, issued by then
commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti. [10] In contrast, the NFL has seen a number of cases
challenging Commissioner Goodell’s disciplinary powers in recent years. [11] Thus, by
implementing a more fair and impartial system for disciplining its players, the NFL can
eliminate issues of litigation altogether.
1. Deflategate is the allegation against the New England Patriots, and specifically
quarterback Tom Brady, for illegally deflating the footballs during the 2015 AFC
Championship game against the Indianapolis Colts. For more information
on Deflategate, see Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Brad S. Karp & Lorin L. Reisner, Investigative
Report Concerning Footballs Used During the AFC Championship Game on January 18,
2015 1 (May 6, 2015).
2. For more on this topic, see Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League
Commissioner Disciplinary Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3.1 Berkeley J. Ent. & Sports L. 93
(2014); Joshua A. Reece, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner: How Independent
Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL’s Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 359, 404 (2010); Logan O’Shaughnessy, After
Review: An Open Letter to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell Suggesting That Limiting the
League’s Disciplinary Power Under the Personal Conduct Policy May Be in the League’s
Best Interests, 88 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 527 (2011); Jeremy R. Abrams, Making the Right
Call: Why Fairness Requires Independent Appeals in U.S. Professional Sports Leagues, 97
Marq. L. Rev. 469 (2013).
3. Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement 41 (2012).
4. Id. at 42.
5. Id.
6. Pacifini, supra note 2 at 114 (“The inherent problem with this system . . . is that . . . the
vast majority of other decisions, was a two to one decision, with the neutral arbitrator
casting the deciding vote.”).
7. Id.
8. Joshua A. Reece, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner: How Independent
Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL’s Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 359, 404 (2010). Reece’s article discusses the
viability of the NBA’s arbitration process as well, noting that he NBA hires independent
arbitrators from outside organizations. Id. Additionally, the NBA disqualifies arbitrators
who have had a previous business relationship with any professional athletes or
leagues. Id. (quoting Grievance and Arbitration Procedure and Special Procedures with
Respect to Disptes Involving Player Discipline, Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, 326-42,
http:// www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20XXXI.pdf.).
9. Reece, supra note 8.

10. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989). (Giamatti was not barred by
jurisdictional grounds from his ability to discipline Rose). It should be noted that MLB
professional athlete Alex Rodriguez filed an action in New York to vacate an arbitration
award suspending him for 211 games. See Alexander Emmanuel Rodriguez v. Major
League Baseball, et. al., 2014 WL 114181 (S.D.N.Y.). However, Rodriguez and Major
League Baseball settled this case prior to litigation. Id.
11. See, e.g., Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 88 F. Supp. 3d
1084 (D. Minn. 2015) (Adrian Peterson); Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l
Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Minn.) aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Nat’l Football
League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (Kevin Williams and Pat Williams).
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